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A seller (she) faces a single buyer (he) who holds a biased and private
prior belief regarding whether the product fits his need (which brings
him a higher payoff than otherwise). The seller can provide additional
information about the product that helps the buyer privately refine his
belief. We fully characterize the revenue-maximizing menu of prices
and disclosure policies that follows a simple cutoff structure. While the
diversity in the priors alone is not sufficient to trigger price discrimi-
nation, the presence of information design induces the optimal mech-
anism featuring both information and price discrimination. Further-
more, the seller does not strictly benefit from charging upfront pay-
ments for information.
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1 Introduction
In markets for experience goods, consumers do not know their willingness
to pay prior to consumption, especially if they are newcomers to the market.
However, they may form their own beliefs regarding possible payoffs before
making purchasing decisions. This process can potentially induce diversity
in consumers’ beliefs. An optimistic buyer who receives (possibly biased)
good reviews thinks that his valuation is more likely to be high, whereas a
pessimistic one assigns excessive weights to lower valuations. For example,
a consumer who is about to buy a new ipad for study purposes might under-
rate the distractions that an ipad can cause to himself. Consequently, he is
over-optimistic about his valuation for an ipad.
On the other hand, there are many ways by which the seller can pro-
vide additional information that helps the buyer correct his belief. For in-
stance, software suppliers usually offer free-trial versions of the product to
their consumers. They can also just provide product guides or some kinds
of informative advertising about the product. Hence, the seller’s strategies
include not only pricing but also information disclosure.
Some natural questions arise in such situations. How could the seller
screen the buyer’s degrees of optimism using information design and pric-
ing strategies? Will the seller practice price and/or information discrimi-
nation? Should the seller provide information to the buyers free of charge?
This paper aims to answer these questions in a simple monopolistic screen-
ing setup. More precisely, our model features a single buyer1 who only cares
if the product fits his need (which brings him a higher valuation than oth-
erwise). From the seller’s perspective, the buyer holds a biased belief about
the likelihood that the product matches with him. The buyer’s degree of op-
timism is his private information (his type). The seller designs a menu of
1Another interpretation is that there is a continuum of buyers.
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prices and disclosure policies to screen the buyer’s types. We fully charac-
terize the revenue-maximizing menu that follows a simple cutoff rule. Ac-
cordingly, the seller offers full information associated with a higher price to
a relatively pessimistic buyer whose type is below the cutoff and no informa-
tion combined with a lower price for an optimistic one.
Our main result is regarding the interaction of information and price dis-
crimination in screening the consumer’s biased beliefs. Eliaz and Spiegler
(2008) emphasizes that under some environments, consumer’s degrees of
optimism is necessary for price discrimination. We show that, when con-
sumer’s optimism is not sufficient for prices to be discriminated under the
optimal mechanism, information design makes it happen. More precisely,
without information design, it is optimal for the seller to post a single price
and serve the buyer only if he is sufficiently optimistic. This is because she
cannot refine the buyer’s belief and hence, has to set prices based on the
buyer’s private (ex-ante) valuation (calculated based on his biased prior).
Posted price is optimal for such a screening setup. However, with informa-
tion control, the optimal mechanism features a menu of different informa-
tion - price pairs and serves also the buyer who is very pessimistic. The seller
now can convince a pessimistic buyer to buy the good when his valuation is
high indeed by providing him additional information. After knowing that his
valuation is high, the buyer is willing to pay up to his own valuation. The op-
timistic buyer who is more confident of getting a high payoff, however, gets
more attracted to the offer with a lower price even though it is less informa-
tive.
The second result is about the optimality of free information. We find
that the seller does not benefit from charging advance payments for infor-
mation if the buyer only cares whether the product matches his need. The
idea is that information is charged no matter whether the buyer buys the
good or not. Hence, it does not alter the buyer’s marginal rent from his
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purchase. As a result, the optimal disclosure policy (represented by trading
probabilities) remains unchanged. Similar to the case with free information,
a relatively optimistic buyer receives no information (and always buys the
good) while a pessimistic one gets full information (and buys the good if his
value is high). Under such an allocation rule, the advance payments for in-
formation become redundant. The seller can fully extract the fully-informed
buyer’s rent by charging him the highest possible price (his true valuation)
for the good. The buyer, who always buys and receives no information, pays
a total payment for the good and information. Hence, the price for the good
and information fee are interchangeable for the seller. This result explains
the wide popularity of free information provision in practice such as free tri-
als, returns with full refunds, and informative advertising.
1.1 Related literature.
Screening degrees of optimism. Our framework adds consumer’s biased
beliefs and information design in an otherwise standard sequential screen-
ing setup initiated by Courty and Li (2000). To the best of our knowledge,
Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) is the only paper, apart from ours, considering non-
common priors in a sequential screening setup2. In their model, the buyer
is biased about their preference after signing the contract, and hence, their
payoff from consumption 3. Among other results, they find that the diversity
in consumers’ degree of optimism is necessary for price discrimination. In
our environment, however, Proposition 1 shows that consumers’ difference
in prior beliefs is not sufficient to generate price discrimination. We then in-
2Other papers work on competitive screening priors such as Armstrong and Vickers
(2001) and Sandroni and Squintani (2007). See Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) for a more detailed
literature review on screening levels of optimism.
3In Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), the buyer is uncertain about whether his preference is rep-
resented by the utility function u(x) or v(x) where x is the quantity of consumption and
v(x) ≥ u(x) ∀x. The buyer, furthermore, is biased about the likelihood that his utility func-
tion is v(.) from the seller’s perspective.
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troduce information design which, combined with diverse priors, activates
price discrimination. As far as we are aware, our paper is the first to analyze
the interaction between consumer’s biased beliefs, information design, and
price discrimination.
Bayesian persuasion. In line with the Bayesian persuasion framework fol-
lowing the seminal works by Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011), we impose no restrictions on the seller’s information structures. Fur-
thermore, similar to the private persuasion literature, the disclosure mech-
anism is contingent on the buyer’s private information (see Bergemann and
Morris (2016) and Guo and Shmaya (2019)). Differing from a pure persua-
sion framework, the seller in our setting designs a joint information and
price mechanism.
Pricing with information design. Our paper is close to the literature com-
bining mechanism design with private disclosure. Early contributions in-
clude Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006). Recent
papers allow for general information structures, see Guo, Li and Shi (2019),
Smolin (2019), and Wei and Green (2020). None of these papers, however,
allows for biased buyers whose prior beliefs are different from the seller. In
addition, they focus on the case with either upfront-charged information
or free information. Considering a simpler valuation space, we manage to
show that the seller could not do strictly better in terms of revenue maxi-
mization by charging prices for information.
Regarding the role of information design in activating price discrimina-
tion, Lewis and Sappington (1994) is the first to formalize how information
provision facilitates market segmentation. The buyers in their setup, how-
ever, do not have private information. Bang and Kim (2013) also points out
the role of information provision in price discriminating buyers of heteroge-
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neous priors. These two papers focus on such classes of restricted informa-
tion structures. Recently, Wei and Green (2020) analyzes the interaction of
information and price discrimination in a more general environment. Our
setup differs from Wei and Green (2020)’s in two aspects. First, they assume
common priors. Second, the buyer’s private information in their model is his
personal taste - one component of his valuation, as opposed to the buyer’s
prior belief in our setting. These differences lead to new challenges on the
technical side as well as new insights and interpretations for the optimal
mechanism. In particular, that the buyer’s private type is his prior belief
breaks the quasi-linearity of the buyer’s payoff under the presence of infor-
mation design. This, in turn, hinders directly using standard mechanism
design techniques to solve for the optimal mechanism. Therefore, our main
methodological contribution is to propose a novel two-step procedure in
characterizing the optimal mechanism where quasi-linearity does not hold.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and section 3 presents the benchmark case where the seller does not control
information. Section 4 characterizes the optimal mechanism and section
5 establishes the optimality of free information. Section 6 discusses some
extensions and section 7 concludes. All omitted proofs are in Appendix A.
2 Model
Environment. A buyer considers whether to buy a product from a monop-
olist. His utility from consumption (valuation), denoted by v, is ex-ante un-
known. Moreover, his valuation can be either high (vH) or low (vL), depend-
ing on whether the product matches his need. Formally, the valuation space
is binary V = {vL, vH}with vH > vL.
From the seller’s perspective, the buyer holds a private and biased belief
about his valuation, modeled by his type θ. Formally, the buyer of type θ
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thinks that the good fits him with probability P(θ) ≡ Prob(v = vH) which is
increasing in θ. It is without loss of generality to assume that P(θ) = θ. There
is a continuum of types 4, distributed over the interval Θ = [θ, θ] by F (θ) that
admits a density f(θ).
The seller knows that the product fits the buyer with probability θS. From
the buyer’s perspective, type θ > θS is relatively optimistic with higher θ be-
ing more optimistic, whereas type θ < θS is relatively pessimistic with lower
θ being more pessimistic. The seller maximizes her revenue with reservation
utility c where vL ≤ c ≤ vH .
Information Disclosure. The seller can provide additional information about
the good that helps the buyer refine his belief privately (only the buyer ob-
serves the signal). Information is modelled using the concept of a statistical
experiment E ≡ (S, π) that consists of two parts:
• A signal space S.
• A likelihood function π that maps each state (valuation) to a distribu-
tion of signals: π : v → ∆(S).
As the buyer’s type is his prior belief, it correlates with the distribution of
signals through the buyer’s Bayesian updating process.
Selling mechanism. To screen the buyer’s types, the seller designs a menu
of prices for the good and statistical experiments, denoted by {(pθ, Eθ)θ}. For
now, we assume that information is provided free of charge. We will prove
that the seller does not benefit from upfront-charged information in Section
5.
4The results also hold under a discrete type space.
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Timing. The timing of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. Specifically, the
seller first announces and commits to her selling mechanism. Nature then
chooses the buyer’s valuation v ∈ V and his type θ ∈ Θ. Upon observing his
type θ privately and the mechanism, the buyer decides whether to partici-
pate. If participating, the buyer reports his type θ̂ to the seller. The informa-
tion is then disclosed according to the experiment assigned for his reported
type. After observing the signal privately, the buyer decides whether to buy



















Figure 1: Timing of the model.
Note that the buyer can walk away after observing the information (after
step 5 in Figure 1) without buying and paying anything.
Seller’s problem. The seller solves for the optimal selling mechanism, i.e.
the optimal menu of prices and experiments, that maximizes her revenue. In
order to characterize the optimal mechanism, we impose the usual mono-
tone hazard rate assumption.




3 Benchmark - No information design
Without information control, the seller can only use a menu of prices and
trading probabilities {pθ, qθ}θ to screen the buyer’s optimism.
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In this case, since the seller cannot provide information to refine the
buyer’s belief, her revenue depends on the buyer’s perspective per se. As
the buyer is risk-neutral, we can think of him as having valuation v(θ) =
θvH + (1− θ)vL = vL + θ∆v, where ∆v ≡ vH − vL. It then becomes a standard
screening problem where the buyers have heterogeneous valuations for the
good. By usual techniques, we can show that the seller does not benefit from
price discrimination. She offers a posted price which equals to the ex-ante
value of a cutoff type. Hence, the buyer is excluded if she is sufficiently pes-
simistic.
Proposition 1. The seller can achieve the maximized revenue by posting a
single price p∗bm = θ
∗
bmvH + (1− θ∗bm)vL, where θ∗bm is the cutoff type that solves:










(pθ − c)qθdF (θ)
subject to: v(θ)qθ − pθ ≥ v(θ)qθ′ − pθ′ (ICθ→θ′)
v(θ)qθ − pθ ≥ 0 (IRθ)
Using the standard technique in mechanism design, we obtain the envelope



















Since the virtual surplus of type θ, given by v(θ) − ∆v 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
, increases in θ
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under assumption 1, the optimal allocation follows the following cutoff rule:
qθ =




where θ∗bm = max{θ | vL + ∆v − ∆v
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
≤ c}. This allocation rule can be
supported by a posted price: p∗bm = v(θ
∗) ≡ θ∗vH + (1− θ∗)vL.
In the next section, we will show that if the seller controls not only prices
but also information provision, she offers a menu of different price-experiment
pairs to screen the buyer’s priors under the optimal mechanism. Moreover,
the pessimistic types are served under the optimal menu if her valuation is
high indeed.
4 Characterization of the optimal mechanism
4.1 Sufficiency of binary-signal experiments
Given that prices are deterministic, i.e. the seller cannot set signal-contingent
prices, Lemma 1 shows that it is without loss of optimality to focus on the
class of binary-signal experiments.
Lemma 1. It is without loss of optimality to restrict to binary-signal experi-
ments where the signal space consists of two signals “buy” and “not buy”.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Hence, an experiment can be represented by trading probabilities {qθ(vH), qθ(vL)}θ
- the probabilities that signal “buy” is sent at each state v for each type θ. The
seller’s problem thus reduces to finding the optimal menu {pθ, qθ(vH), qθ(vL)}θ.
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The trade probabilities need to satisfy the feasibility constraint:
∀θ : 0 ≤ qθ(vH), qθ(vL) ≤ 1 (FCθ)
4.2 Relevant constraints
As is common in private persuasion problems, the seller faces two kinds
of constraints. First, the obedience constraints (OB) are to ensure that the
buyer, having reported his type truthfully, follows the recommended signals.
Second, the truth-telling constraints (IC) are to incentivize the buyer to re-
port his type truthfully.
Obedience constraints. To make the buyer obedient, his posterior valua-
tion must be weakly higher than the price of the good after signal “buy”, and
lower than the price after signal “not buy”. Formally, there are two obedience
constraints associated to each type θ who has reported truthfully, as follows:
Eθ[v|θ̂ = θ, “buy”] ≡
θqθ(vH)vH + (1− θ)qθ(vL)vL
θqθ(vH) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)
≥ pθ (OBbθ)
Eθ[v|θ̂ = θ, “not buy”] ≡
θ(1− qθ(vH))vH + (1− θ)(1− qθ(vL))vL
θ(1− qθ(vH)) + (1− θ)(1− qθ(vL))
≤ pθ
(OBnbθ )
where we use the shorthand Eθ[.] to denote the expectation calculated based
on type θ’s prior: Prob(v = vH) = θ.
The obedience constraints hence can be written as bounds on prices,
where the bounds are functions of the trading probabilities.
p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) ≤ pθ ≤ p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) (OBθ)
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Truth-telling constraints. Regarding IC constraints, the seller needs to han-
dle double deviations where the buyer first lies about his type and then dis-
obeys the signals. If the buyer disobeys the signals, his behavior can be one
of the three following cases:
(i) always buys regardless of the signals;
(ii) never buys regardless of the signals;
(iii) does the opposite to the recommended signals (buy after signal “not
buy” and do not buy after signal “buy”).
The following lemma helps to eliminate some kinds of double deviations.
Lemma 2.
1. If the buyer misreports his type to be a lower type, he will either follow
the recommended signals or always buy.
2. If the buyer misreports his type to be a higher type, he will either follow
the recommended signals or never buy.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The interim payoff for a buyer of type θ who reports as θ̂ and follows the
recommended signals is given by:
U(θ, θ̂, follow) = θqθ̂(vH)(vH − pθ̂) + (1− θ)qθ̂(vL)(vL − pθ̂)
while that for a buyer of type θ who reports as θ̂ and always buy is given by:
U(θ, θ̂, always buy) = θvH + (1− θ)vL − pθ̂
Based on Lemma 2, there are only two kinds of IC constraints:
12
1. Downward IC constraints: type θ do not want to mimic any lower type
θ′ (θ > θ′) and then either follows signals/always buy:
θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) ≥
max{θqθ′(vH)(vH − pθ′) + (1− θ)qθ′(vL)(vL − pθ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
follow signals for θ′




2. Upward IC constraints: type θ does not want to mimic any higher type
θ′ (θ < θ′) and then either follows signals/never buy:
θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) ≥
max{θqθ′(vH)(vH − tθ′) + (1− θ)qθ′(vL)(vL − tθ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸










[θSqθ(vH) + (1− θS)qθ(vL)](pθ − c)dF (θ)
subject to (FCθ), (OBθ), (ICdwθ ), and (IC
uw
θ ) for all type θ.
Our approach is to consider a relaxed problem where all double devia-
tions are ignored and then prove that the solution for the relaxed problem
survives the ignored constraints under the monotone hazard rate assump-
tion. The truth-telling constraints considered in the relaxed problem is such
that type θ does not want to mimic any other type θ′ and then obey the sig-
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nals. Formally, it is given by:
θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) ≥ θqθ′(vH)(vH − pθ′) + (1− θ)qθ′(vL)(vL − pθ′)
(ICobθ→θ′)






[θSqθ(vH) + (1− θS)qθ(vL)](pθ − c)dF (θ)
subject to (FCθ), (OBθ), and (ICobθ→θ′) for any type θ, θ
′:
θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) ≥ θqθ′(vH)(vH − pθ′) + (1− θ)qθ′(vL)(vL − pθ′)
p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) ≤ pθ ≤ p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL))
0 ≤ qθ(v) ≤ 1
Without double deviations, the seller’s problem looks closer to a usual
mechanism design problem. However, there are two key differences that we
want to emphasize here. First, the presence of information disclosure with
the distribution of signals being correlated with the buyer’s type breaks the
quasi-linearity of the buyer’s payoff. Hence, the envelope representation of
the seller’s revenue is not determined totally by trade probabilities (alloca-
tion rule) as seen in the benchmark. Instead, it contains also prices (which
in turn are bounded by non-linear functions of trade probabilities). In effect,
we cannot solve the problem following the standard techniques in mecha-
nism design. To handle this issue, we follow a two-step procedure by (i) tak-
ing prices as given in the first step, solve for optimal allocation rule, and then
(ii) finding the optimal prices given the optimal allocation rule and the price
bounds. Second, the seller’s revenue is not simply the difference between
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total surplus and the buyer’s rents which are now measured under different
prior valuation distributions.
We now present the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, the optimal mechanism of the relaxed prob-
lem follows a cutoff rule where:
• All types θ ≥ θ∗ receive no information and pay price
pθ = p
∗ ≡ Eθ∗ [v] = θ∗vH + (1− θ∗)vL.
• All types θ < θ∗ receive full information and pay price pθ = vH .
with θ∗ = max
{
θ | vL + θ∆v −∆v
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
≤ θS(vH − c) + c
}
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
This cutoff mechanism is indeed optimal under the original problem.
Proposition 2. The optimal mechanism of the relaxed problem specified in
Theorem 1 satisfies all the ignored constraints, and hence, is optimal under
the original problem.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
Thus, under the optimal mechanism, the seller offers a menu of two op-
tions: full information associated with a higher price that targets relatively
optimistic types and no information with a lower price for relatively pes-







- receive no information
- always buy
- obtain some rents
- receive full information
- buy only if v = vH
- are fully extracted
Figure 2: Optimal mechanism with binary valuations and continuous types.
Without information design, the seller gives up on types that are suffi-
ciently pessimistic. However, when she can control information to the seller,
she serves all the types. To convince a pessimistic buyer to purchase the
good, the seller discloses all information to that buyer and charges him the
highest possible price (the high valuation). For a buyer who is optimistic
enough, he is more attracted to the contract with no information and a lower
price. The seller pools all such optimistic types (above the cutoff) and hence,
leaves some rents for sufficiently high types.
Note that the cutoff type can also be one of the two corners θ and θ. In
such situations, the seller discloses no information (θ∗ = θ) or full informa-
tion (θ∗ = θ) to the buyer. These selling mechanisms are employed in many
real-world applications in which the sellers offer free returns with a full re-
fund or no return at all.
4.4 Impact of information design
We now present the welfare consequences of information design. As we have
shown, the optimal mechanism with or without information follows certain
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cutoff rules. The major difference lies in how the seller deals with the buyer
whose type is lower than the cutoff (pessimistic types). Without informa-
tion design, the seller excludes those types and gets zero revenue from them.
However, when she has information control, the seller can provide them full
information to those types which convince them to buy when their value
is actually high. Therefore, the seller now can achieve some revenue from
those types. As a result, the cutoff type in the benchmark case (the type
where the seller gets a zero revenue) is lower than that under information
design (where the seller obtains a positive revenue θS(vH − c)).
In effect, that the cutoff type is higher with information design reduces
the rent for buyer whose type lies above the cutoff while the other types
obtain zero rents. On the other hand, the seller’s surplus and total welfare
weakly increase. These welfare impacts are formally stated in proposition 3.
Proposition 3. . The cutoff type θ∗ under the optimal mechanism is higher
than that in the benchmark problem without information design θ∗bm. As a
result, with information design,
• the seller’s revenue and the total surplus weakly increase.
• the sufficiently optimistic types of the buyer receive a lower positive rent,
while pessimistic ones still get zero payoffs.
Proof. Let us remind that:
θ∗ = max
{
θ | vL + θ∆v −∆v
1− F (θ)
f(θ)









Since vL + θ∆v −∆v
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
increases in θ and c ≤ θS(vH − c) + c, it follows
that θ∗bm ≤ θ∗. As a consequence, p∗ ≡ θ∗vH + (1 − θ∗)vL ≥ p∗bm ≡ θ∗vH +
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(1−θ∗)vL). Hence, a relatively optimistic buyer (who is at the high end of the
type distribution) pays higher price and obtains a lower (positive) rent when
the seller controls information.
Since vL ≤ c ≤ vH , it is efficient to trade only when v = vH . With informa-
tion design, trade always happens when v = vH . Moreover, as θ∗ > θ∗bm, trade
happens less when v = vL. Hence, total surplus weakly increases thanks to
information design.
The seller, obviously, is weakly better off if she has information control.
As long as information disclosure is used, she is strictly better off. This hap-
pens when θ∗ > θ, or vL + θ∆v −∆v
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
< θS(vH − c) + c.
5 Optimality of free information
We now consider the situation where the seller can ask the buyer to pay for
information upfront. Hence, the seller can offer a menu of {aθ, pθ, qθ(vH), qθ(vL)}θ∈Θ
to screen the buyer’s priors where aθ is the price of information charged for
type θ’s access to information.
The seller now has more tools to screen the buyer’s types. For example,
she can manipulate information fees while fixing the prices of the good to
incentivize the buyer. This is impossible with only free information. Theo-
retically, the seller’s revenue should be weakly higher because she can always
set aθ = 0 for all θ. The question is whether she can get strictly higher rev-
enue. We will prove that it is not the case. The idea is that information is
charged no matter whether trades happens or not. Hence, it does not affect
the buyer’s marginal payoff, and consequently, the optimal trading proba-
bilities. The buyer will either receive no information (and always buys the
good) or full information (and buys the good if his true value is vH). Given
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such allocation rules, the advance payments for information become redun-
dant. This is because, for the buyer who only buys at vH , the seller can fully
extract his rent by charging a price p = vH . For the buyer who always buys
but receives no information, the total payment for him is the sum of pay-
ments for the good and information. This means that price for the good and
information fee are indeed interchangeable.
We now formally formulate the seller’s problem and solve for the optimal
mechanism.
5.1 Relevant constraints
Obedience constraints. Because the information fee is sunk, the obedi-
ence constraints are not affected: prices are required to be smaller (respec-
tively, higher) than the buyer’s posterior value after signal “buy” (respec-
tively, “not buy”).
Individually rational (IR) constraints. The seller now needs to ensure that
the buyer wants to pay for information upfront:
V (θ) ≡ U(θ|θ̂ = θ, follow) ≥ 0 (IRθ)
where: U(θ|θ̂ = θ, follow) = −aθ + θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ)
An important remark is that for any type θ, the information information
aθ is separated from trading probabilities {qθ(v)}v. Thus, the marginal payoff
for an honest and obedient buyer of any type from purchasing the good does
not depends on information fees.
IC constraints. The IC constraints are modified slightly given that the buyer
needs to pay information fees conditional on his reported type. As before,
there are two kinds of IC constraints:
19
1. Downward IC constraints: type θ do not want to mimic any lower type
θ′ (θ > θ′) and then either follows signals/always buy:
−aθ + θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) ≥
max{−aθ′ + θqθ′(vH)(vH − pθ′) + (1− θ)qθ′(vL)(vL − pθ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
follow signals for θ′





2. Upward IC constraints: type θ does not want to mimic any higher type
θ′ (θ < θ′) and then either follows signals/never buy:
θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) ≥
max{−aθ′ + θqθ′(vH)(vH − tθ′) + (1− θ)qθ′(vL)(vL − tθ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸







The seller designs the menu {aθ, pθ, qθ(v)}θ∈Θ to maximize her revenue which
comes from both the payments for the good and information:∫
θ
{
− aθ + [θSqθ(vH) + (1− θS)qθ(vL)](pθ − c)
}
dF (θ)
subject to (FCθ), (OBθ), (IRθ), (IC ′θ
dw) and (IC ′θ
uw) for any θ.
It is also convenient to look at the seller’s relaxed problem where all dou-
ble deviations are ignored. Hence, the truth-telling constraints considered
in the relaxed problem is such that any type θ does not want to mimic any
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other type θ′ and then obey the signals:








− aθ + [θSqθ(vH) + (1− θS)qθ(vL)](pθ − c)
}
dF (θ)
subject to (FCθ), (OBθ), (IRθ), and (IC
′ob
θ→θ′) for all θ and θ
′:
− aθ + θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) ≥ −aθ′ + θqθ′(vH)(vH − pθ′) + (1− θ)qθ′(vL)(vL − pθ′)
p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) ≤ pθ ≤ p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL))
0 ≤ qθ(v) ≤ 1
5.3 Optimal mechanism
The following result says that the optimal mechanism features a similar cut-
off rule as in the case with free information.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, the optimal mechanism follows a cutoff
rule where:
• All types θ ≥ θ∗ receive no information and are charged at prices (aθ, pθ)
such that aθ + pθ = p∗ ≡ Eθ∗ [v] = θ∗vH + (1− θ∗)vL.
• All types θ < θ∗ receive full information and are charged at a price pθ =
vH for the good and get information for free aθ = 0.
with θ∗ = max
{
θ | vL + θ∆v −∆v
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
≤ θS(vH − c) + c
}
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Proof. See Appendix A.5
As previously mentioned, the trading probabilities are unchanged be-
cause information fees do not distort the buyer’s marginal rent. The in-
formation payments, as a result, do not matter for the seller’s revenue. By
charging p = vH , the seller fully extracts a fully informed buyer. On the
other hand, instead of charging separated payments for information aθ and
for the good pθ to an uninformed buyer, the seller can just set a single price
p′θ = aθ + pθ and obtain the same revenue.
In particular, it immediately follows from Proposition 4 that the optimal
mechanism can be implemented by setting aθ = 0 for all type θ and pθ = vH
if θ < θ∗ and pθ = p∗ if θ ≥ θ∗. Hence, the seller does not need to employ
upfront payments for information. This is the main message of our theorem
2 which establishes the optimality of free information.
Theorem 2. The seller’s maximized revenue can be achieved by the optimal
selling mechanism when information is provided free of charge.
6 Discussions
6.1 More general valuation space
Our analysis restricts to the binary valuation space V = {vL, vH}. The in-
tuition for this environment is that the buyer cares whether the product fits
his need or not (for example, a pair of shoes either does or does not fit a con-
sumer). Even though this environment applies to many markets in practice,
it is worthwhile to investigate the case with a more general valuation space.
However, solving the optimal selling mechanism for both general type
and valuation space becomes very challenging. Even with binary valuations,
the quasilinearity of payoffs no longer holds. This hinders directly applying
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standard techniques and hence, significantly complicates solving for the op-
timal mechanism. With general valuation space V , the buyer’s private type
is his prior distribution over V . Formally, the buyer of type θ thinks that
his valuations are distributed according toGθ(V ) that admits a density gθ(v).
The seller thinks that the buyer’s value distribution is indeedGS(V ) of which
the density is gS(v). Following Guo and Shmaya (2019) who characterize the
optimal disclosure policy in a pure persuasion framework where there is a
receiver (like the buyer in our model) who privately knows his prior (type),
we assume that types are ranked by likelihood ratio order. More precisely,
type θ ranks higher than type θ′ (or intuitively, type θ is more optimistic than




From the seller’s perspective, the buyer is either optimistic or pessimistic
about his value distribution. Hence, it is natural to model that type θ is rela-
tively optimistic (respectively, pessimistic) from the seller’s perspective if for









Guo and Shmaya (2019), discusses in section 5.1 of their paper, that the op-
timal disclosure policy can be solved under some assumptions on the priors
and payoff functions. Formally, it is required that for every θ ∈ Θ, at any
valuation v:




increases in v. (1)
Here, v − p is the buyer’s payoff and p is the seller’s from the transaction at
price p. Note that prices are exogenously given in their setup.
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This condition fails in our model. Taking the price p offered for type θ as
given, if type θ is optimistic from the seller’s perspective which means that
gθ(v)
gs(v)
increases in v, then (1) fails at v < p. On the other hand, if type θ is
pessimistic from the seller’s perspective which means that gθ(v)
gs(v)
decreases in
v, then (1) fails at v > p. Furthermore, in our framework, prices are endoge-
nously designed which makes it even harder to verify when (1) is satisfied.
Furthermore, even if condition (1) is satisfied, the optimal disclosure pol-
icy for given prices (as proved by Guo and Shmaya (2019)) possesses an inter-
val structure. More precisely, each buyer is recommended to buy the good
when his valuation belongs to a certain interval. When prices can be dis-
criminated across buyer’s types, we do not know the relative positions of
intervals assigned for different types. Therefore, there is not much we can
say about how the disclosure policies and prices are designed across types
under the optimal mechanism.
6.2 Multiple agents
In our model, there is a single buyer. A natural extension is when there are
multiple buyers who are homogeneous in their ex-post valuation from con-
sumption but differ in their priors. Indeed, with several buyers, it is easier
for the seller to extract the buyers’ rents. For example, Zhu (2017) shows
that the seller can fully extract the buyers’ rents by using the disclosure pol-
icy that is individually uninformative and aggregately revealing. The idea
is that each agent’s posterior belief about his valuation coincides with his
prior (the signal is uninformative). However, by endogenously creating the
correlations of signals generated by experiments for buyers, the seller can
infer fully the true valuation from the agents’ truthful reports of their sig-
nals. Consequently, the buyers are left with no rents. This disclosure policy
is robust to information sharing and collusion within a subset of buyers.
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6.3 More general action space
In our model, as prices are deterministic (not signal-contingent), the buyer’s
action space is binary (buy / not buy). An important and interesting gener-
alization would be to the case of more general action space. For example,
the buyer can choose the quantity of the good to buy after getting the sig-
nal released by the experiments. In such a scenario, the buyer’s prior beliefs
are over her marginal valuation (instead of her valuation as in our current
model). Hence, for the buyer to have more than two actions, there should
be more than two possible marginal valuations. Under the presence of the
seller’s information control, explained in subsection 6.1, solving for the op-
timal mechanism with general valuation space is very challenging and out
of the scope of this paper5.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the interaction between consumer’s optimism, informa-
tion design, and price discrimination. In a monopoly setting where the seller
faces a buyer whose prior is private and biased, we fully characterize the
revenue-maximizing mechanism to screen the buyer’s priors. When the di-
versity in the consumer’s biased beliefs is not enough to activate price dis-
crimination, we show how information control can induce the seller to price
discriminate. Furthermore, the seller does not strictly benefit from upfront
fees for information. Equivalently, it is without loss of optimality to restrict
to the case where information is provided free of charge. The optimal mech-
anism replicates many real-life selling strategies that exploit the role of in-
formation provision.
5Spiegler (2011) (Chapter 5) provides a detailed analysis on screening the buyer’s levels
of optimism with a general action space. However, the setups considered there do not allow
for information design.
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On the technical side, the characterization of the optimal selling mech-
anism involves technical issues coming from combining information and
mechanism design. Most importantly, since the buyer’s private type is his
prior, the buyer’s interim payoff is no longer quasi-linear as in standard mech-
anism design models. We propose a novel two-step procedure to handle this
issue.
The extensions to a more general valuation and action space for the buyer
induce many new challenges as discussed in section 6 and are out of the
scope of this paper. However, it would definitely be interesting and impor-
tant to see the interaction between price and information discrimination in
such general setups. We leave these extensions for future research.
A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose the optimal mechanism is the menu Γ ≡ {pθ, Eθ = (Sθ, πθ)}
where the signal space Sθ is arbitrary. Consider the following mechanism
Γ′ ≡ {pθ, E ′θ = (S ′θ, πθ)} where s′θ ∈ S ′θ = {“buy”, “not buy”}. Moreover, for
each θ, s′θ is given by:
s′θ(s) =
“buy” if Eθ(v|s) ≥ pθ“not buy” if Eθ(v|s) < pθ
As prices and trading probabilities are unchanged, both the buyer’s payoff (if
being truthful and obedient) and the seller’s revenue are not affected. More-
over, since the statistical experiment under Γ′ is less informative by Black-
well’s order, the payoff for each type of buyer is lower when he deviates. As
a result, if all IC constraints are satisfied under the original mechanism Γ,
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they should continue to hold under the new mechanism Γ′. In addition, the
obedience constraints are satisfied based on the construction of S ′θ. Thus,
the seller is weakly better off by using the new mechanism without violating
any constraints.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Consider a buyer of type θ who reports his type as θ̂. His posterior
valuations are given by:
Eθ[v|θ̂, “buy”] ≡
θqθ̂(vH)vH + (1− θ)qθ̂(vL)vL
θqθ̂(vH) + (1− θ)qθ̂(vL)
Eθ[v|θ̂, “not buy”] ≡
θ(1− qθ̂(vH))vH + (1− θ)(1− qθ̂(vL))vL
θ(1− qθ̂(vH)) + (1− θ)(1− qθ̂(vL))
By simple algebra, we can show that Eθ[v|θ̂, “buy”] and Eθ(v|θ̂, “not buy”) in-
crease in θ for any θ and θ̂. Therefore:
1. If θ ≥ θ̂:
• After signal “buy”: since Eθ[v|θ̂, “buy”] ≥ Eθ̂[v|θ̂, “buy”] ≥ pθ̂, type
θ always buy.
• After signal “not buy”: type θ either does not buy (if pθ̂ ≥ Eθ[v|θ̂, “not buy”] ≥
Eθ̂[v|θ̂, “not buy”]) or buys (ifEθ[v|θ̂, “not buy”] ≥ pθ̂ ≥ Eθ̂[v|θ̂, “not buy”])
Thus, a type θ who has mimicked a lower type, will either follow the
signals or always buy the good.
2. If θ < θ̂, by similar arguments, we can show that type θ will either be
obedient or never buy the good. Thus, a type θ who has mimicked a
higher type, will either follow the signals or never buy the good.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Our strategy is to first solve the strongly relaxed problem where the
(ICobθ→θ′) is replaced with an envelope condition. We then prove that the so-
lution of the strongly relaxed problem is optimal under the original problem
(and hence, also under the relaxed problem).
Note that, the interim payoff of an honest and obedient buyer of type θ is
given by:
V (θ) = U(θ, θ̂ = θ, follow) = θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ)
V (θ) is convex, and hence, it is differentiable almost everywhere. By enve-
lope theorem, the following condtion on the buyer’s marginal rent is neces-
sary for (ICobθ→θ′) to be satisfied:
V ′(θ) = qθ(vH)(vH − pθ)− qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) (ENV)






(pθ − c)[θSqθ(vH) + (1− θS)qθ(vL)]dF (θ)
such that for any θ:
V ′(θ) = qθ(vH)(vH − pθ)− qθ(vL)(vL − pθ)
p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) ≤ pθ ≤ p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL))
0 ≤ qθ(v) ≤ 1
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(pθ − c)[θqθ(vH) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)]dF (θ) +
∫
θ











[(pθ − c)(θS − θ)[qθ(vH)− qθ(vL)]dF (θ)
Using (ENV) and the fact that
∫
θ































dF (θ)− V (θ)















dF (θ)− V (θ)
subject to ∀θ: p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) ≤ pθ ≤ p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL))
0 ≤ qθ(v) ≤ 1
Using pθ ≤ p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) for any θ and in particular for θ = θ, one can
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show that V (θ) ≥ 0. Hence, it is optimal to set V (θ) = 0.
Moreover, we can solve the optimal mechanism by point-wise maximiza-
tion. We will characterize the optimal {pθ, qθ(vH), qθ(vL)} for each type θ un-
der the strongly relaxed problem following a two-step procedure.
Before solving the optimal mechanism, note that to make the buyer obey
signal “buy”, it is necessary that pθ ≤ vH ∀θ (see constraint (OBbθ)).
Step 1. Taking the price pθ for type θ where pθ ≤ vH for all θ as given, solve
for the optimal trading probability qθ(v). Hence, we will need to convert the
bounds imposed on prices into those on allocation rule qθ(v) for each θ and
v. Rewrite the upper bound on prices as follows:
p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) ≥ pθ ⇔
θqθ(vH)vH + (1− θ)qθ(vL)vL
θqθ(vH) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)
≥ pθ
⇔ θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) ≥ 0
This is equivalent to:





qθ(vL); qθ(vL) ∈ [0, 1] if pθ < vH
qθ(vH) ∈ [0, 1]; qθ(vL) = 0 if pθ = vH
(2)
Also, the lower bound on prices is given by:
p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) ≤ pθ ⇔
θ(1− qθ(vH))vH + (1− θ)(1− qθ(vL))vL
θ(1− qθ(vH)) + (1− θ)(1− qθ(vL))
≤ pθ
⇔ θ(1− qθ(vH))(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)(1− qθ(vL))(vL − pθ) ≤ 0
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This is equivalent to:





(1− qθ(vL)), qθ(vL) ∈ [0, 1] if pθ < vH
qθ(vH) ∈ [0, 1]; qθ(vL) ∈ [0, 1] if pθ = vH
(3)
Combining (2) and (3), we can unify the bounds allocation rules as follows:
• If pθ = vH :
qθ(vH) ∈ [0, 1]; qθ(vL) = 0 (4)
• If pθ < vH :











qθ(vL) ∈ [0, 1]
(5)
Hence, in step 1, taking prices as given, the seller finds (qθ(vL), qθ(vH)) for
each θ to maximize the seller’s venue from type θ:








subject to bounds on allocation rules given by (4) if p = vH and (5) if p < vH .
Given that qθ(vH) is bounded by linear functions of qθ(vL) according to (4)
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and (5), R(θ) is linear in qθ(vL). Hence, at the optimum, we must have:
qθ(vL) ∈ {0, 1}
Consider the following two cases based on whether pθ = vH or pθ < vH .
• Case 1: pθ = vH .
Then qθ(vL) = 0 by (4). We obtain: R(θ) = θS(vH − c)qθ(vH). As vH ≥ c,
it is optimal to set qθ(vH) = 1. In this case, the buyer of type θ receives
full information and the seller’s revenue from this type is given by:
RF (θ) = θ(vH − c) > 0
• Case 2: pθ < vH .
– If q(vL) = 1. By (5), 1 ≥ q(vH) ≥ 1. Thus, q(vH) = 1.
– If q(vL) = 0. Then the seller’s revenue reduces to:




Since the seller can obtain RF (θ) > 0, this candidate can be the




this case, it is optimal to set qθ(vH) = 1. Then, the seller’s revenue
from type θ becomes:




Step 2. Given the optimal qθ(v), solve for the optimal prices.
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Notice that we can also rewrite the function as follows:




















+ (θS − θ)
]
> 0




+ (θS − θ)
]
< 0
∈ [p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)), p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL))] otherwise
We now solve for the optimal prices for each case of the optimal alloca-
tion rule.
• Case 1: qθ(vL) = 0, qθ(vH) = 1.
In this case, p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) = p(1, 0) = vL and p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) =
p(1, 0) = vH . Hence, the bounds on prices reduce to: vL ≤ pθ ≤ vH .
As qθ(vH) > qθ(vL), the prices are chosen as follows:
– If 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
+(θS−θ) ≥ 0, then pθ = vH . The seller’s revenue from type
θ is:
RFθ = θS(vH − c)
– If 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
+ (θS− θ) < 0, then pθ = vL. The seller’s revenue from type
θ is:




• Case 2: qθ(vH) = qθ(vL) = 1,
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In this case, the buyer always receives signal “buy”, and hence we only
need to impose upper bound on price pθ ≤ p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) = p(1, 1) =
θvH + (1− θ)vL.
In this case, the buyer receives no information and the seller’s revenue
from type θ is RN(θ) = θ(vH − c) + (1− θ)vL − c−∆v
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
Note that RN(θ) − R′F (θ) = (1 − θS)(vL − c) ≤ 0. Hence, the seller weakly
prefers no disclosure rather than full disclosure associated with a posted
price pθ = vL for type θ. As a result, there are only two candidates left:
• qθ(vH) = qθ(vL) = 1, then pθ ∈ [0, vH ].






+ vL − c.
• qθ(vH) = 1, qθ(vL) = 0, pθ = vH (for
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
+ (θS − θ) ≥ 0).
RF (θ) = θS(vH − c).






− (vL − c) + θS(vH − c) decreases in θ. Therefore,
there exists a cutoff θ∗ such that ∆R(θ) ≥ 0⇔ θ ≤ θ∗. The optimal cutoff θ∗ is
the highest type where full disclosure brings a higher revenue from this type
to the seller. Formally:
θ∗ = max
{





≤ c+ θS(vH − c)
}
The price associated with uninformative experiment (no disclosure) is
only required to satisfy pθ ≤ Eθ[v] (all such prices induce the same rev-
enue for the seller). To make the cutoff mechanism optimal in the original
problem, we choose the price associated with uninformative experiment as
pθ = p
∗ ≡ E∗θ[v] = θ∗vH + (1− θ∗)vL.
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Proposition 2 will show that this cutoff mechanism satisfies all the ig-
nored constraints in the original problem. It follows that it is optimal under
the relaxed problem.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We now show that the cutoff mechanism that solves the strongly re-
laxed problem is also optimal under the original problem. To do so, we prove
that the cutoff rule satisfied all the IC constraints. It is sufficient to prove that
for any two types θ1 and θ2 such that θ1 ≥ θ∗ > θ2, type θ1 does not want to
mimic θ2 and then obey signals or always buy while type θ1 does not want to
mimic type θ2 and then obey signals or never buy.
First, consider type θ1. By being truthful and obedient, he gets a non-
negative payoff. By mimicking θ2, he obtains a zero payoff if obeying the
signal (buy at price vH when v = vH) and a negative payoff if always buy (buy
at price vH no matter his true value). Thus, type θ1 is weakly better off from
being truthful and obedient.
Next, consider type θ2. By being truthful and obedient, he gets a zero
payoff. By mimicking θ1, he a negative payoff if obeying the signal (is charged
at price Eθ∗ [v] > Eθ2 [v]) and a zero payoff if never buy. Thus, type θ2 is weakly
better off from being truthful and obedient.
To sum up, the optimal mechanism satisfies all the constraints and hence,
is optimal under the original problem.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Again, we first solve the strongly relaxed problem where the (ICobθ→θ′)
is replaced with an envelope condition. The solution turns out to be the
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same cutoff mechanism with free information. We then prove that this mech-
anism is optimal under the original problem.
The interim payoff of an honest and obedient buyer of type θ is given by:
V (θ) = U(θ, θ̂ = θ, follow) = −aθ + θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ)
V (θ) is convex, and hence, it is differentiable almost everywhere. By enve-
lope theorem, the following condition on the buyer’s marginal rent is neces-
sary for (ICobθ→θ′) to be satisfied:
V ′(θ) = qθ(vH)(vH − pθ)− qθ(vL)(vL − pθ)
which is exactly the same as in the case of free information. The seller’s rev-





















[(pθ − c)(θS − θ)[qθ(vH)− qθ(vL)]dF (θ)


















dF (θ)− V (θ)
As before, we set V (θ) = 0.
36
Strongly relaxed problem. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the seller’s




















p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) ≤ pθ ≤ p(qθ(vH), qθ(vL)) (6)
0 ≤ qθ(v) ≤ 1 (7)
aθ ≤ θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) (8)
The only new constraint now is (IRθ) condition: aθ ≤ θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) + (1−
θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ). Combined with 0 ≤ qθ(v) ≤ 1, this constraint is equivalent
to:
1 ≥ qθ(vH) ≥
aθ + (1− θ)(pθ − vL)qθ(vL)
θ(vH − pθ)
; qθ(vL) ∈ [0, 1] if pθ < vH
qθ(vH) ∈ [0, 1]; qθ(vL) = 0 if pθ = vH
(9)
Combining (4), (5), and (9), we can unify the bounds allocation rules as fol-
lows:
• If pθ = vH :
qθ(vH) ∈ [0, 1]; qθ(vL) = 0 (10)
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qθ(vL) ∈ [0, 1]
(11)
We can solve the optimal mechanism by point-wise maximization. We
will characterize the optimal contract {aθ, pθ, qθ(vH), qθ(vL)} for each type θ
under the strongly relaxed problem following a three-step procedure.
Step 1. Taking the prices (aθ, pθ) as given, solve for the optimal qθ(v) for
















subject to (10) if p = vH and (11) and p < vH .
Note that the objective function is separable between information fee
and trading probabilities. Moreover, the term without information fee is ex-
actly the same as in step 1 of the proof for Theorem 1. Hence, by following
the same arguments, we can show that the optimal trading probabilities can
be of two cases.
1. qθ(vH) = qθ(vL) = 1. In this case, the buyer receives no information.
2. qθ(vH) = 1; qθ(vL) = 0. In this case, the buyer receives full information.
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Step 2. Given the information fee and the optimal allocation rule solved in
Step 1, solve for the price of the good pθ.
• Case 1: qθ(vH) = qθ(vL) = 1. As in the proof of Theorem 1, in this case,
the value of the objective function does not depend on price pθ. Hence,
we can choose any price pθ such that the constraints (6) and (8) hold,
that is:
pθ ≤ θvH + (1− θ)vL
aθ + pθ ≤ θvH + (1− θ)vL
We will choose pθ = θ∗vH + (1− θ∗)vL−max{aθ, 0} (where θ∗ is to be de-
fined). This choice will make the solution of the strongly relaxed prob-
lem optimal under the original problem.
• Case 2: qθ(vH) = 1; qθ(vL) = 0. As in proof of Theorem 1, in this case, it
is optimal to set price p = vH
Again, we can show that, given information fee aθ, it is optimal to provide
full information to all types θ < θ∗ and no information to other types, where
θ∗ is the same cutoff defined in the proof of Theorem 1.
Step 3. Given the optimal allocation rule and prices solved in Step 1 and 2,
solve for the information fee aθ.
As the objective function increases in aθ, it is optimal to choose the high-
est possible aθ such that constraint (8) is satisfied: aθ ≤ θqθ(vH)(vH − pθ) +
(1− θ)qθ(vL)(vL − pθ) for all θ.
• For θ < θ∗: pθ = vH , qθ(vH) = 1, qθ(vL) = 0. Hence, aθ ≤ 0. Then, it is
optimal to set aθ = 0.
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• For θ ≥ θ∗: qθ(vH) = 1, qθ(vL) = 1. Hence, aθ ≤ θvH +(1−θ)vL−pθ for all
θ. Obviously, aθ ≤ 0 is weakly dominated by setting aθ > 0. Moreover, if
aθ > 0, given the optimal price pθ, aθ is uniquely determined by:
aθ + pθ = Eθ∗ [v] = θ∗vH + (1− θ∗)vL
Thus, with upfront-charged information, the optimal mechanism is in-
deed the same as the one with free information. The optimal menu consists
of two contracts: one offers full information with price equals to vH and the
other discloses no information and charges a total payment that equals to
aθ + pθ = Eθ∗ [v]. Hence, this mechanism satisfies all IC constraints, as shown
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